Abstract. In this paper, we present a method for computing Nash equilibria in feedback strategies. This method gives necessary and sufficient conditions to characterize subgame perfect equilibria by means of a system of quasilinear partial differential equations. This characterization allows one to know explicitly the solution of the game in some cases. In other cases, this approach makes a qualitative study easier. We apply this method to nonrenewable resource games.
Introduction
Since the creation of game theory by Von Neumann in 1928, remarkable efforts have been made in the development of this discipline. The theory of differential games provides an adequate framework for the treatment of problems appearing in fields as different as economics, engineering, or biology (Refs. 1-3).
There are a great number of applications that use open-loop Nash equilibria in the literature on nonzero-sum differential games. Due to its complexity, the analysis of equilibria based on feedback rules is less usual, so Nash equilibrium is not subgame perfect.
In this paper, we propose a new approach for the study and determination of Nash equilibrium in feedback strategies. This approach is based on the papers of Bourdache-Siguerdidjane and Fliess (Refs. 4-5) for nonlinear optimal control problems. It consists of characterizing a Nash equilibrium by means of a system of quasilinear partial differential equations. This system is deduced from the application of the maximum principle of Pontryagin by means of the elimination of the costate vectors that appear in the Hamiltonians associated with the players.
Section 2 states a differential game in general form. In Section 3, we apply the necessary condition of the maximum principle of Pontryagin, yielding a new optimality condition for the Nash equilibrium. In Section 4, we prove that this necessary condition is also sufficient, taking into account appropriate hypotheses on the players' Hamiltonians. These hypotheses are not as strict as the concavity sufficient conditions that are usually used in this kind of problems. The theorem proved in this section also shows that the Nash equilibrium is subgame perfect. In Section 5, we apply the results to nonrenewable resource differential games. After giving a condition that guarantees the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium, a qualitative study is performed. We include a comparative analysis of solutions obtained when considering variations in the model.
Description of the Game
We consider an N-person noncooperative differential game over a fixed bounded time interval, namely, 
